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Chapter 1: ‘Dressed in a little brief authority’: Authority Before, During, and After 
Shakespeare’s Plays 
Katie Halsey and Angus Vine 
In his epigram ‘To William Camden’ Ben Jonson praised his friend and former 
schoolmaster in the following lavish manner: 
What name, what skill, what faith hast thou in things! 
What sight in searching the most antique springs! 
What weight, and what authority in thy speech! 
Man scarce can make that doubt, but thou canst teach. 
(Jonson, 2012, V, pp. 119-20 [ll. 7-10]) 
Jonson’s anaphoric praise locates Camden’s scholarly merits in both his deep 
knowledge of the past and his mastery of eloquence; the list of attributes conjoins his 
attention to ‘things’ with his historical perspicuity and his proficiency in ‘speech’. 
Camden is celebrated for matter, knowledge, and style, and then finally, as a result of 
all these, for his virtuoso pedagogy. The anaphora, moreover, suggests an equivalence 
between these attributes, emphasizing that it is their combination that earns Camden 
the accolade of the man to whom Britain owes her ‘great renown and name’ (ll. 3-4) 
earlier in the epigram. As such, the poem is an entirely fitting tribute to a man who 
was at once pedagogue, grammarian, antiquary, and historian. 
Strikingly, Jonson couches this compliment to his former teacher, first and 
foremost, in terms of authority, with the anaphora culminating in the hypermetrical 
‘and what authority in thy speech’ (l. 8). Authority in early modern English 
commonly denoted the ‘power to influence the opinion of others, esp. because of 
one’s recognized knowledge or scholarship’ (OED, s.v. ‘authority’, n. III. 5[a]), a 
usage synonymous with classical learning and acknowledged expertise. This is the 
sense that pertains in Jonson’s poem: Camden’s authority as a writer and scholar is 
predicated on his historical learning, his plumbing ‘antique springs’. That authority, 
moreover, is also inextricably linked with classical and humanist learning: the second 
line of the second couplet is an imitation of Pliny the Younger’s praise for his friend 
the Roman lawyer Titius Aristo (nihil est quod discere velis quod ille docere non 
possit [1.22.2]; see Haynes, 2003, p. 71), mimetically enacting the very combination 
of matter, knowledge, and style for which Camden himself is praised. In 
 
 
characteristically Jonsonian fashion, that praise of Camden’s authority also therefore 
ends up being an act of self-aggrandizement and commendation of his own authority 
and learning. As Lawrence Lipking has noted, speaking of Jonson’s better known 
poem ‘To the memory of my beloved, The Author Mr. William Shakespeare: and 
what he hath left us’, Jonsonian eulogy frequently turns back as much on the poet as 
on the object of his praise (Lipking, 1981, pp. 142, 144). In the Camden epigram, the 
hierarchical relation between master and pupil (rather than fellow playwright and 
poet) is clearer and less contested, but the dynamics of authorization and praise are 
largely the same – as the opening lines, testimony to Jonson’s own scholarly and 
writerly authority (‘Camden, most reverend head, to whom I owe | All that I am in 
arts’ [ll. 1-2]), make clear.  
 
It is hardly surprising that Jonson, the archetypal classicizing poet, would have 
understood authority in this way. Nor is it surprising that he should have praised his 
schoolmaster as the source of his own authority and as the national writer par 
excellence. Nonetheless, few people today, certainly outside the academy, would 
think of Camden in relation to either ‘authority of speech’ or the nation’s ‘great 
renown and name’. That honour, when it comes to early modern writers at least, 
would normally be afforded instead to the man Jonson described in his conversations 
with William Drummond of Hawthornden as wanting ‘art’ (Jonson, 2012, V, p. 361), 
and whom he famously said had ‘small Latin and less Greek’ (‘To the memory of my 
beloved, The Author Mr. William Shakespeare: and what he hath left us’, l. 31). It is 
Shakespeare, not the Westminster schoolmaster, whose face has adorned Bank of 
England banknotes, an imprimatur that sets the seal of monumental authority on both 
the promissory notes themselves and the cultural figure displayed upon them 
(Holderness, 1988a, p. xi). Furthermore, it is Shakespeare, not Camden, whose texts 
have provided the archetypal testing material for new media and technologies; when 
Thomas Edison, for example, tested his inventions, including the electric pen that he 
patented in 1876, he habitually turned not to the monumental opening of the 
Britannia, but to the much more familiar, quasi-proverbial opening soliloquy of 
Richard III (Galey, 2014, pp. 170-2). And it is Shakespearean monuments and 
inscriptions, not Camdenian ones, that decorate public spaces and buildings across the 
western world: from Giovanni Fontana’s 1874 marble statue, which stands in 
Leicester Square in London (Engler, 2011, p. 439), to the motto (misquoted) from The 
 
 
Tempest (‘WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE’ [cf. 2.1.246]), which is carved on a 
plinth on the Pennsylvania Avenue side of the National Archives in Washington, DC 
(Garber, 2008, pp. 284-5; Galey, 2014, pp. 49-52). Shakespeare’s words – indeed, his 
material presence alone – it seems, bestow considerable cultural capital, 
monumentalizing purpose, and linguistic authority. Camden and Jonson, by contrast, 
certainly in the modern era, have rarely been put to such edifying purposes.1 
 
Jonson’s epigram reminds us that Shakespeare’s contemporaries would not 
necessarily have anticipated these developments. Certainly, for much of the 
seventeenth century, it would have been by no means apparent that his works would 
be afforded the position of unique cultural authority that they have come to possess. 
Indeed, until Nicholas Rowe’s biographical essay, ‘Some account of the life of Mr. 
William Shakespear’, which prefaced his 1709 edition of the Works, Shakespeare’s 
plays were generally afforded no more authority than those of contemporaries such as 
Jonson or Fletcher, the other playwrights of the era whose works appeared in Folio 
collections, and to whom Shakespeare was most often compared (De Grazia, 1991, 
pp. 33-48). The same went for the fate of the plays on the stage. As Michael Dobson 
has noted, by the 1630s, just a decade after the publication of the First Folio, the 
number of plays in regular repertory had been reduced to perhaps just five: Hamlet, 
Othello, Julius Caesar, The Merry Wives of Windsor, and 1 Henry IV (Dobson, 1992, 
p. 2). Moreover, even in the Restoration era, when Shakespeare did start to return to 
the centre of English literary culture, many of the plays were performed only in 
heavily revised and substantially rewritten versions – a curious coming together that, 
as Dobson has also observed, reveals ‘that adaptation and canonization, so far from 
being contradictory processes, were often mutually reinforcing ones’ (Dobson, 1992, 
p. 5). Initially, at least, perceptions of Shakespeare’s authority (or rather lack thereof) 
were such that his texts were freely available to later playwrights for adaptation and 
appropriation; it was only in the early eighteenth century that some kind of 
recognizable authorial authority began widely to obtain (Dobson, 1992, p. 61). 
 
In fact, to some of Shakespeare’s seventeenth-century readers, his later 
position as the figure of ultimate cultural authority would have come as a very great 
surprise. The critic and historian Thomas Rymer, for example, whose trenchant views 
in his A Short View of Tragedy; It’s Original, Excellency, and Corruption. With Some 
 
 
Reflections on Shakespear and other Practitioners for the Stage (1693) are often seen 
as the embodiment of leaden-footed and rules-obsessed neoclassical criticism, would 
certainly have been shocked. For Rymer, the problem with Shakespearean drama in 
large part is its lack of authority, the departure from its classical and modern sources, 
which leads to what he identifies as its unreasonableness and unnaturalness.2 
Speaking of Othello, Rymer observes that ‘Shakespear alters it from the Original in 
several particulars, but always, unfortunately, for the worse’; in illustration of this, he 
cites the description of the titular character as ‘the Moor of Venice: a Note on pre-
eminence, which neither History nor Heraldry can allow him’ (Rymer, 1693, p. 87). 
Julius Caesar fares little better, with Rymer particularly critical of the blooding 
episode (3.1.106-11) and Brutus’s visceral language there: ‘For, indeed, that 
Language which Shakespear puts in the Mouth of Brutus wou’d not suit, or be 
convenient, unless from some son of the Shambles, or some naturall offspring of the 
Butchery’ (Rymer, 1683, p. 151). The issue for Rymer, then, is a matter of decorum, 
but also a question of probability and reason: at this moment, he suggests, Brutus 
speaks less like a member of the Roman nobility and more like a common butcher or 
slaughterman. He also points out, in a telling parallel with his criticism of Othello, 
that Shakespeare’s scene is unauthorized by ‘History’ (p. 150): that is to say, by 
Plutarch’s Lives, his principal source for the play. 
 
Few critics now would now object to Othello on grounds of heraldic 
probability; nor would many be troubled by Shakespeare’s departure from Plutarch to 
dramatize the moment when Brutus’s Republican ideals most starkly unravel in the 
face of political reality. Furthermore, few modern critics would share Rymer’s 
hotheaded indignation: at the moment when he condemns Shakespeare for departing 
from ‘History’, he speaks of ‘Shakespear’s own blundering Maggot of self 
contradiction’ (p. 150). Indeed, the choleric and invective that characterize his 
criticism have almost invariably met with revulsion and/or ridicule. As John Dryden 
observed in 1693, in a letter to his friend and fellow critic John Dennis, ‘[a]lmost all 
the Faults which he has discover’d are truly there; yet who will read Mr. Rymer, or 
not read Shakespeare? For my own part, I reverence Mr. Rymer’s Learning, but I 
detest his Ill-Nature and Arrogance’ (Vickers, 1995, p. 86). Nonetheless, Rymer’s 
views were echoed, albeit in a less strident form, by many who valued the authority of 
the ancients, and the neoclassical unities of time, place and action. These included 
 
 
Dryden himself, whose Essay of Dramatic Poesy (1668) would set the terms of 
Shakespearean criticism for at least a century.  
 
Intemperate and ‘pedantic’ as it is (see Eliot, 1932, p. 97), Rymer’s criticism 
does nonetheless remind us of the extent to which the issue of authority was at stake 
in the seventeenth-century reading and reception of Shakespeare.3 One of the 
principal reasons for this was because, from the First Folio onwards, Shakespeare was 
very much identified as the poet of nature rather than art, as Margareta De Grazia has 
compellingly shown (De Grazia, 1991, p. 46). John Heminge and Henry Condell 
initiated this view, characterizing Shakespeare as a spontaneous author who wrote 
without revision, and whose ingenuity enabled him to invent without the artfulness 
customarily associated with conceptions of genius in the early modern era or, indeed, 
the inkblots linked with scribal and authorial correction: ‘His mind and hand went 
together: And what he thought, he vttered with that easinesse, that wee haue scarse 
receiued from him a blot in his papers’ (Shakespeare, 1623, sig. A3r). Leonard Digges 
then reinforced this view in his commendatory poem ‘Vpon Master WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, the Deceased Authour, and his POEMS’, written for the edition of 
the sonnets and miscellaneous poems published by John Benson in 1640. ‘Poets are 
borne not made,’ Digges observes in the opening line of that poem, and Shakespeare 
is the prima facie evidence for this: ‘when I would prove | This truth, the glad 
remembrance I must love | Of never dying Shakespeare, who alone, | Is argument 
enough to make that one’ (Shakespeare, 1640, sig. *3r, ll. 1-4). With Shakespeare, 
moreover, the reader finds ‘Art without Art unparaleld as yet’; ‘Nature onely helpt 
him’, Digges adds (ll. 10-11). For Rymer, it was precisely the lack of art in Digges’s 
second (punning) sense – that is, in the sense of skill as a result of knowledge or 
practice (OED, s.v. ‘art’, n. I. 1) – that was the problem, and what lay behind the 
faults that he identifies in Othello and Julius Caesar. By 1668, this view of 
Shakespeare as the poet of nature, rather than art, had become almost a truism, as we 
can see in Dryden’s Of Dramatic Poesy: 
 
He was the man who of all modern, and perhaps ancient poets, had the largest 
and most comprehensive soul. All the images of Nature were still present to 
him and he drew them, not laboriously, but luckily; when he describes any 
thing, you more than see it, you feel it too. Those who accuse him to have 
 
 
wanted learning, give him the greater commendation: he was naturally 
learned; he needed not the spectacles of books to read nature; he looked 
inwards, and found her there (Dryden, 1918, p.67). 
 
If seventeenth-century readers increasingly constructed Shakespeare as the 
poet of nature, Jonson, by contrast, was almost always figured as the supreme poet of 
art – and, as such, also as a more immediately obvious authority figure. Where 
Shakespeare’s works, in Heminge and Condell’s, Digges’s, and Dryden’s accounts at 
least, are imagined as transcending the strictures of literary precedents and classical 
authority, Jonson’s works were widely recognized for their embodiment of those very 
things. As Edward Heyward put it in his commendatory poem for Jonson’s own 1616 
Folio (‘TO BEN. IONSON, on his workes’): 
 
 Words speake thy matter; matter fills thy words; 
  And choyce that grace affords 
 That both are best: and both most fitly plac’t, 
  Are with new VENVS grac’t 
 From artfull method. (Jonson, 1616, sig. ¶6v, ll. 15-19) 
 
Heyward’s praise emphasizes that Jonson’s poetic powers reside in his mastery of 
humanist discourse, his matching of matter and word in the manner requisite for true 
eloquence, and that his transformative powers thus rely not on nature, but on art, 
method, and knowledge. This contrast between Shakespeare and Jonson was, of 
course, in some senses a rhetorical construct: as recent scholars have shown, 
Shakespeare’s classical learning, much of which he would have imbibed from his 
schooldays in Stratford-upon-Avon, was considerably more extensive than popular 
consciousness has often allowed (see, inter alia, Martindale and Martindale, 1990; 
Bate, 1993; Miola, 2000; Gillespie, 2001; Martindale and Taylor, 2004; Burrow, 
2004; and Burrow, 2013).4 Furthermore, the familiar narrative of Shakespeare and 
Jonson as literary and intellectual opposites and antagonists (as presented in Dryden’s 
Of Dramatic Poesy and elsewhere) was, as Ian Donaldson has shown, largely a later 
historical invention, which had as much to do with evolving conceptions of genius as 
with the reality of the authors’ relations (Donaldson, 2001). Nonetheless, there is little 
doubt that the two outstanding dramatists of the Elizabethan and Jacobean eras did 
have very different conceptions of literary authority and that those conceptions did 




In illustration of this, it is hard to imagine Jonson, the poet of ‘artfull method’, 
complaining about ‘art made tongue-tied by authority’ in the way that Shakespeare 
does in Sonnet 66 (l. 9). Shakespeare’s complaint has sometimes been understood as 
an allusion to the fetters of press censorship and as his sole reference to the 
frustrations of working under such conditions (Clare, 1999, p. 39). But, as the Oxford 
and Penguin editors of the Sonnets have both pointed out, the line also seems to signal 
the frustration of being limited, or inhibited, by precedent and tradition (Shakespeare, 
2002, p. 512; and Shakespeare, 1986b, p. 257). Of course, there is an irony in 
Shakespeare complaining about authority in a sonnet, the most codified of all literary 
forms. That irony, moreover, is only emphasized by the sonnet’s dominant rhetorical 
scheme: the anaphora which structures the poem’s list of ills, and which results in the 
word ‘And’ repeated ten times at the beginning of ten different lines. Furthermore, the 
litany of complaints in the sonnet (including ‘art made tongue-tied by authority’) 
turns out to be conditional, as the closing couplet makes clear: ‘Tired with all these, 
from these would I be gone, | Save that to die I leave my love alone’ (ll. 13-14). So 
the poem is not a straightforward rejection of authority in favour of some notion of 
unbridled rule breaking and literary freedom: but it does signal the kind of 
commitment to transformative imitation that, as Margaret Tudeau-Clayton and Colin 
Burrow have both emphasized, distinguishes Shakespeare’s engagement with 
classical learning and authority (Tudeau-Clayton, 1998; and Burrow, 2004, p. 16) 




The story of Shakespeare’s eighteenth-century transformation into the paradigmatic 
authorizing literary figure has been extensively told (see, for example, Bate, 1989b; 
De Grazia, 1991; Dobson, 1992; Ritchie and Sabor, 2012; and Rumbold, 2016). This 
story begins with the gradual return of Shakespeare to the stage at the Restoration, 
and it takes in the construction of Shakespeare as an “author” figure in the wake of 
the emergence of copyright following the Statute of Queen Anne of 1710. As such, it 
also tells of the reification of the (now commonly accepted) connection between 
controlling authorship and authority – a connection at odds, though, with both what 
we know about the collaborative nature of dramatic production in the early modern 
era, and the material, textual, and biographical remains themselves. Further 
 
 
noteworthy developments in the story include the first great age of Shakespearean 
textual scholarship and the series of editions by Pope, Theobald, Warburton, Johnson, 
Capell, and Steevens that this produced, all of which followed and built upon Rowe’s 
1709 Works in what has been described as a ‘dynastic tradition’ (De Grazia, 1991, p. 
3). Other landmarks in this story include David Garrick’s formative Stratford Jubilee 
of 1769, the three-day Shakespearean celebration in the playwright’s hometown, 
which did much to substantiate his reputation as the national poet, and the emergence 
of notions of authorial authenticity in the wake of Edmund Malone’s groundbreaking 
decision to include a textual and critical apparatus in his 1790 The Plays and Poems 
of William Shakespeare.5 The Ireland forgeries of the 1790s add yet another 
dimension to the tale of Shakespearean authority in the eighteenth century. The 
intense excitement generated by the faked deeds, letters and manuscripts that Ireland 
claimed to have discovered, followed by the crushing disappointment of Malone’s 
decisive exposure of the forgeries, reveals something of what was invested in 
Shakespearean authority by 1795. In a letter to George Steevens of 1796, James 
Boaden based his refutation of the supposed Lear on the poor quality of the 
versification in the manuscript – an argument clearly derived from Shakespeare’s 
reputation as a writer of genius (Boaden, 1972). For Malone, in contrast, authority 
primarily depended on historical accuracy – his Inquiry into the Authenticity of 
Certain Miscellaneous Papers and Legal Instruments (1796) proved conclusively that 
various dates, as well as the handwriting and orthography were incorrect, and hence 
that the documents must be fraudulent. Authority and authenticity thus began to 
coalesce.  
 
As well as these literary and authorial perspectives, the story of emergent 
Shakespearean authority also had a significant political dimension, as Michael 
Dobson has shown: ‘the transformation of Shakespeare’s status from the comparative 
neglect of the Restoration to […] national, indeed global pre-eminence,’ he observes, 
‘constitutes one of the central cultural expressions of England’s own transition from 
the aristocratic regime of the Stuarts to the commercial empire presided over by the 
Hanoverians’ (Dobson, 1992, p. 8). More recently, it has also been suggested that 
Shakespeare’s pervasive presence in eighteenth-century cultural life had a significant 
moral dimension. Kate Rumbold has argued that Shakespeare emerged in the same 
era as a source of moral authority: something to which the ‘repeated acts of quotation’ 
 
 
in contemporary novels, such as those discussed in Chapter Fourteen of this volume, 
which ‘invest him with an enduring emotional and moral authority’, attest (Rumbold, 
2016, p. 50). ‘Perhaps the novel’s most significant contribution,’ she adds, ‘is to 
construct Shakespeare as a personal authority on whom all kinds of individual can 
call’ (p. 53). 
 
 By 1814, Jane Austen could describe Shakespeare as ‘part of an Englishman’s 
constitution’. Her character, Henry Crawford, continues, ‘His thoughts and beauties 
are so spread abroad that one touches them everywhere; one is intimate with him by 
instinct.’ In response, another character agrees: ‘His celebrated passages are quoted 
by everybody; they are in half the books we open, and we all talk Shakespeare, use 
his similes, and describe with his descriptions’ (Austen, 2005, pp. 390-1). But, as Gail 
Marshall has argued, Shakespeare’s pervasive presence in the nineteenth century in 
fact points to a contested legacy: ‘Shakespeare was not just the darling of civic bodies 
looking to advertise their cultural credentials, but belonged just as much to the 
ordinary people of Britain who used his voice to contest contemporary power 
distribution’ (Marshall, 2012, p.2). Evidence collected by historians of reading such 
as Andrew Murphy and Jonathan Rose certainly supports this point. As Murphy 
points out, the increasing availability of cheap editions of Shakespeare’s texts made 
his works ever more accessible to working-class readers (Murphy, 2010, pp. 58-94; 
see also St Clair, 2004, pp. 140-157 and 692-714), and such readers sometimes saw in 
Shakespeare’s texts a legitimisation of their own challenges to authority. For example, 
Rose discusses a number of readers for whom Shakespeare ‘was a proletarian hero 
who spoke directly to working people’ (Rose, 2001, p.122-3). For some working-class 
readers, Shakespeare’s own obscure birth and ‘small Latin and less Greek’ – his 
supposed lack of learning and ‘natural’ genius – was inspirational. And they found in 
his plays ‘a language of radical political mobilization’, an anti-authoritarian stance 
that allowed them to co-opt Shakespeare for their own purposes. J. L. Clynes, a textile 
worker who later became deputy leader of the House of Commons, for example, 
‘drew inspiration from the “strange truth” he discovered in Twelfth Night: “Be not 
afraid of greatness (“What a creed! How it would upset the world if men lived up to 
it, I thought” […] Reading Julius Caesar, “the realization came suddenly to me that it 
was a mighty political drama” about the class struggle’ (Rose, 2001, p.123). While 
such responses seem willfully to ignore such negative representations of political 
 
 
rebels as the plebeians in Julius Caesar and Jack Cade and his rebels in 2 Henry VI,  it 
is nonetheless significant that two competing notions of Shakespearean authority 
came into being in the nineteenth century. The idea of the ‘People’s Bard’ allowed 
many to see Shakespeare as an anti-hierarchical, anti-authoritarian role model 
authorizing radical left-wing political ideologies, while its polar opposite – what 
Marshall calls the ‘monumental civic Shakespeare’, memorialized in Establishment 
heartlands and invested with all the trappings of high art – implicitly opposed all such 
ideas (Marshall, 2012, p.2).6 The story of Shakepeare’s complex relationship to 
questions of national identity has been well told elsewhere (see Klett, 2009, Tudeau-
Clayton & Maley, 2010, Ivic, 2017), and is discussed in Chapters Five, Six and 
Fourteen of this volume, but it is important also to note that relationship here, and its 
effects in investing Shakespeare with ever greater literary authority.  
 Scholarship has also started to recover Shakespeare’s significance as a figure 
of authority in more recent periods. Topics to have attracted attention range from 
Shakespeare’s importance as an authorizing figure for the emergence of English 
Studies as an academic discipline in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
(Hawkes, 1986) to the rise of bardolatry and the so-called Shakespeare industry, 
focused from Garrick’s Jubilee onwards, on Stratford-upon-Avon and the supposed 
Shakespearean associations of its buildings and places (Holderness, 1988b). Studies 
have also begun to show the importance of Shakespeare’s cultural authority beyond 
England or Britain. Doug Lanier, for example, has recently drawn attention to how 
Union voices in the American Civil War appropriated Shakespeare, drawing on and 
claiming kinship with his long established status as a ‘transcendent, vatic, even quasi-
divine’ figure of English literary authority, while at the same time also explicitly 
Americanizing him (Lanier, 2015, pp. 146, 157-8). Rather like the eighteenth-century 
novels discussed by Rumbold, the website of New York’s Shakespeare Society 
(www.shakespearesociety.org) continues to figure Shakespeare as personal moral 
authority, while directly aligning him with that most American of cities: ‘Shakespeare 
teaches us all how to be better human beings and citizens. A great city like New York 
needs The Shakespeare Society’ (http://www.shakespearesociety.org/who-we-are’ 
accessed 06/04 2017). And recent studies of Shakespeare in Japan, Africa, China, 
India, Korea, Brazil, the Arab world, Latin America and elsewhere (see, for example, 
Ryuta, Carruthers and Gillies, 2001; da Cunha Resende, 2002; Levith, 2004; Banham, 
 
 
Gibbs and Osofisan, 2013) demonstrate the various ways in which Shakespeare is 
appropriated and into different national cultures in diverse and sometimes unexpected 
ways. MIT’s Global Shakespeares archive (http://globalshakespeares.mit.edu/about/) 
bears tribute to the ubiquity of performances of Shakespearean plays and the 
complexity of Shakespeare’s cultural authority in the global economy. 
* 
The essays in Shakespeare and Authority, jointly and individually, are further 
contributions to this story. What sets the volume apart from previous explorations of 
the topic is its chronological and generic scope: essays extend across the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries, and examine 
topics from performance and acting style to architecture, cinema, lexicography, and 
visual culture.7 What also sets the volume apart is that it places its discussions of 
Shakespeare as an authority figure alongside a series of the essays in the first two 
parts of the book, which explore conceptions of authority in and for Shakespeare. 
These essays, which range from discussions of the monarchy to investigations of the 
household, and from explorations of the law to examinations of linguistic, financial, 
and material accountability, consider the construction, performance, and questioning 
of authority across the Shakespearean canon. They also include a series of re-
examinations of Shakespearean sources, both from a methodological perspective and 
as case studies. What this three-fold organization and content enables is a more 
rigorous examination of the significance of Shakespeare for both the history of 
authority as a concept and the shift from auctoritas to more modern understandings of 
the word – one of our principal aims in this book. This tripartite approach, moreover, 
underscores that both the plays themselves and their reception are essential to the 
story. 
 
That authority is a central concern of Shakespearean drama has long been 
recognized. As Robert Weimann notes, the word ‘authority’ occurs no fewer than 60 
times across the canon as a whole (Weimann, 1995, p. 201). The plays in this way 
responded to one of the great shifts in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century 
England: the reconceptualization of authority, in the wake of the Reformation, as 
something no longer accepted and received automatically as a given, but something 
instead to be ‘negotiated, disputed, or reconstituted’ through acts of representation 
 
 
(Weimann, 1996, p. 5) – through speech, performance, and various forms of textual 
inscription. For Weimann, moreover, the Elizabethan theatre was the most important 
place for this exploration of authority and its associated political, religious, and 
juridical discourses; he attributes this to both the indeterminacy of the Elizabethan 
theatre and its different spatial modes of performance and representation and to the 
location of the playhouses themselves in the liberties just outside the city’s 
jurisdiction (Weimann, 1995, pp. 204-6). 
 
In Shakespeare’s plays, perhaps the most obvious dramatization of this 
Reformation redefinition of authority occurs in Act 3 Scene 1 of King John, when the 
king disputes papal sway with Cardinal Pandulph and disavows the legate’s authority 
as a mere earthly commission (3.1.73-86). ‘What earthy name to interrogatories | Can 
task the free breath of a sacred king?’ (3.1.73-4), John asserts in anachronistic lines 
that clearly echo the language of the Henrician Reformation and the discourse of 
Tudor divine right. The rest of John’s speech, including his striking references to 
tolling and tithing (‘no Italian priest | Shall tithe or toll in our dominions’ [3.1.80]), 
largely reiterates the equivalent speech in the play’s most important dramatic source, 
the avowedly Protestant and anonymous history play The Troublesome Raigne of Iohn 
King of England (1591). However, in one significant way, Shakespeare departs from 
his source, and that is by framing the dispute explicitly in terms of authority. Where in 
the earlier play John concludes his rebuttal of Pandulph with a rejection of papal 
supremacy (‘so wil I raigne next vnder God, supreame head both ouer spirituall and 
temprall: and hee that contradicts me in this, Ile make him hoppe headlesse’ [The 
Troublesome Raigne, 1591, sig. E1r]), Shakespeare’s John ends also with a 
reassertion of his own divine authority and rejection of the Pope’s mere ‘mortal’ 
authority: ‘Where we do reign, we will alone uphold | Without th’assistance of a 
mortal hand. | So tell the Pope, all reverence set apart | To him and his usurped 
authority’ (3.1.83-6). Pandulph’s response is not only to excommunicate John 
(3.1.99), but also to legitimize rebellion against him: ‘blessèd shall he be that doth 
revolt | From his allegiance to a heretic’ (3.1.100-1). This time there is a parallel 
passage in the earlier play (‘I Pandulph of Padoa […] pronounce thee accursed 
discharging euery of thy subiectes of all dutie and fealtie that they doo owe to thee’ 
[The Troublesome Raigne, 1591, sig. E1r-v]), although Shakespeare’s blunter 
 
 
wording again makes the exploration of sovereignty and monarchical authority much 
more prominent. 
 
Some of the clearest evidence of the extent to which conceptions of authority 
were in flux at the time comes from contemporary wordlists. Glosses are multiple, 
and often not synonymous, and as such they are testimony to the process of 
redefinition and recalibration that Weimann describes. In his Bibliotheca Eliotæ 
(1542) Sir Thomas Elyot glossed authority in a number of different ways: ‘Authoritas, 
authoritie, credence, puyssaunce, iugement, the inioyeng of possession’ (Elyot, 1542, 
sig. E8r). Importantly, his dictionary also foregrounds the connection (conceptual as 
well as etymological) between authority and author, and his definition of the latter 
goes some to way explaining why one individual rather than another might garner the 
warrantable expertise, the ‘credence’ and ‘puyssaunce’, requisite to operate as an 
authority figure: ‘Author, the first inue[n]tour or maker of a thing also a reporter of 
newes. also a ruler or tutor also he that dothe sell or delyuer a thynge on warrantise. 
also he whom a man foloweth in doynge of any thynge’ (Elyot, 1542, sig. E8r). The 
conjunction here between author and authority, and the implicit relation to textuality 
and inscription, anticipates one of the more striking aspects of Shakespeare’s own 
treatment of authority. As Richard Wilson has observed, in Shakespearean politics, 
authority and authorship are ‘synonymous’; speaking of Jade Cade’s revolt in 2 Henry 
VI, he notes that ‘[t]o the writer of these scenes, rebellion is the rage of the illiterate 
against the written word’ (Wilson, 1993, pp. 27-8).  
 
Later lexicographers tended to be more explicit about the identification 
between authority and sovereignty. Authority was what the holder of high office 
possessed and thus frequently a synonym for the monarch’s (or, for that matter, any 
other official’s) power and rule. John Florio, for example, defined the Italian word 
autorità in his Worlde of Wordes as ‘authoritie, power, free will, command, swaie, 
rule’ (Florio, 1598, sig. C6r), a more delimited and politically more specific list of 
synonyms than Elyot’s gloss, while Henry Cockeram then substantiated this 
association between authority and the exercise of power through a series of glossarial 
examples in his English Dictionarie (1623): 
 
 the Authority of a King. Regallity. 
 
 
 the Authority of a Magistrate. Magistracy. 
 lawfull Authority in a place. Iurisdiction. 
 Authority. Commission. 
 hauing all Authority in’s hand. Omni-regency. 
which hath Authority to keepe out vnworthy persons fro[m] the church. 
Oratory.  
hauing Authority to order and to dispose of matters. Committee. 
      (Cockeram, 1623, sig. A3v) 
 
Cockeram’s lemmata emphasize that authority was a spiritual as well a temporal 
matter and a concept that was at once legislative and dispositive. Other wordlists from 
the period also suggest that authority started to be understood not necessarily as an 
innate quality, but as something that could be adopted or put on, and as such a 
question of performance rather than essence – an insight to which Shakespeare, as we 
shall see, turns out to have been especially important.  
 
 Shakespearean drama, at different moments, entertains, examines, and 
explores all these different senses of the word. In Pericles, for example, authority is 
very much equated with sovereignty and the rightful exercise of the law. When 
Lysimachus, governor of Mytilene, enters the city brothel, he promises Marina that he 
will not abuse his power either to prosecute her for prostitution or to take advantage 
of her: ‘Oh, you have heard something of my power and so stand aloof for more 
serious wooing, but I protest to thee, pretty one, my authority shall not see thee, or 
else look friendly upon thee’ (4.6.77-80). In similar fashion, in All’s Well That Ends 
Well the Countess speaks of the Clown remaining at the court of Roussillon by her 
son’s ‘authority’, and of him taking that as a ‘patent’, or license, ‘for his sauciness’ 
(4.5.55-6), while in 2 Henry IV, after he has read over and acceded to the rebels’ 
demands, Prince John confesses that his ‘father’s purposes have been mistook, | And 
some about him have too lavishly | Wrested his meaning and authority’ (4.1.223-5). 
All three instances reinforce the connection between authority, legislation, and license 
implicit in Florio and Cockeram’s definitions, while the third also underscores the 
essentialness of inscription to the exercise of sovereign authority. As Prince John 
ruefully notes, the king’s authority resides in his words, but that also leaves it open to 
abuse, as interpreters may twist his ‘meaning’ to fit their own purposes. The king’s 
authority thus emerges as oddly fragile and peculiarly limited, subject to both the 
vagaries of language and the good will of his subjects, an idea also central to Joseph 




Few Shakespearean rulers are quite as aware of the evanescence of authority 
as Marlowe’s Barabas after he has ‘gotten, by […] policy’ the governorship of Malta 
(Marlowe, 1969, 5.2.28-34). But Shakespeare does, on various occasions, stage 
governors and rulers made strikingly aware of their own fragility. In Antony and 
Cleopatra, for example, he dramatically stages Antony’s realization of his impotence 
following his humiliation at the Battle of Actium, figuring this explicitly as a melting 
away of authority. ‘Approach there!’ Antony commands Caesar’s messenger Thidias; 
almost immediately, though, he recognizes that his words no longer carry sway and 
reflects grimly, ‘Now gods and devils! | Authority melts from me. Of late, when I 
cried, “Ho!” | Like boys unto a muss kings would start forth | And cry, “Your will?” 
(3.13.90-4). Divested of authority by his dishonour in battle, the man who could once 
render kings schoolboys is reduced to the object of a pert servant’s scorn. 
 
 As to the connection between authority, office, and person, Shakespearean 
drama is characteristically ambiguous. On the one hand, the Duke of Alençon’s words 
in Act 5 Scene 5 of 1 Henry VI associate authority with both the office of kingship 
and the power of the monarch himself. In response to Winchester’s command that the 
Dauphin and the French ‘shall become true liegemen’ to Henry VI’s crown, and that 
the Dauphin shall ‘pay him tribute and submit’, the Duke indignantly replies: ‘Must 
he then be a shadow of himself, | Adorn his temples with a coronet, | And yet in 
substance and authority | Retain but privilege of a private man’ (5.5.133-6). Authority, 
these lines suggest, is what makes the king a king. Constituted through the ability to 
legislate, it signifies, in particular, the status of not being subject to another. True 
monarchical authority, then, is more than just what the material crown signifies; it is 
also, Alençon’s words imply, what inheres in the body of the king. As Colin Burrow 
points out in Chapter Two of this volume, that same sentiment is even more apparent 
in King Lear, when the disguised Kent tells Lear ‘you have that in your countenance 
which I | would fain call master’, that is, ‘Authority’ (1.4.23-4, 26) – lines that lend 
themselves readily to an absolutist reading and a defence of the divine right. Lear may 
have abdicated, but to the loyal Kent he retains the marks of sovereign authority, 
which transcend the external trappings of rule and are signalled by his body itself. On 
the other hand, though, Shakespeare also provides a series of moments that seem to 
deny any innate connection between authority and a ruler or governor’s person. In 
 
 
Coriolanus, for example, the titular character contemns the tribunes of the people 
‘[f]or they do prank them in authority | Against all noble sufferance’ (3.1.23-4). 
Whilst Coriolanus’s words here maintain the hierarchical order essential to notions of 
absolutist government, the charge also recognizes the portability of authority and the 
fact it was something seemingly as easily put on as embodied; to prank in 
Shakespearean English meant to dress up or embellish (OED, s.v. ‘prank’, v. 4.1[b]). 
This is also, of course, the point of Isabella’s famous words in Measure for Measure, 
from which we take this chapter’s title, when she inveighs against Angelo’s unstinting 
and unbending exercise of the law: ‘man, proud man | Dressed in a little brief 
authority, | Most ignorant of what he’s most assured’ (2.2.118-20).  
 
 All these senses of authority are, to a greater or lesser extent, still current 
today. They were also very much current in the age when Shakespeare himself 
became the archetypal authority figure, as the various definitions in Dr Johnson’s 
Dictionary (1755) attest. The most famous of all English lexicographers, Johnson 
defined authority successively as ‘1. Legal power’, ‘2. Influence; credit’, ‘3. Power; 
rule’, ‘4. Support; justification; countenance’, ‘5. Testimony’, and ‘6. Weight of 
testimony; credibility’ (Johnson, 1755). There was, however, one sense of 
Shakespearean authority that Johnson did not include, and that is barely current today, 
but which has considerable significance for our understanding of both Shakespeare’s 
method of composition and the relation of the plays to their source materials. That is 
the peculiarly (but not exclusively) early modern sense of authority associated with 
books, reading, and humanist theories of knowledge production. Authority in this 
sense constitutes what we take from others’ books to authorize our own writing and 
knowledge – a variant, of course, of Jonson’s use in his epigram to Camden with 
which we began this chapter. The most striking Shakespearean example of authority 
in this sense occurs in Love’s Labour’s Lost, when in response to the King of 
Navarre’s foreswearing of women in favour of study and books, Biron observes: 
‘Small have continual plodders ever won, | Save base authority from others’ books’ 
(1.1.86-7). Authority here is associated with commonplace books and commonplace 
learning – methods that are apparently fit only for the dullest, most plodding of 




 Biron’s remark, however, is not quite the straightforward trenchant dismissal 
it initially appears. For while his observation does demonstrate that Shakespeare’s 
attitude towards textual authority was more than just unthinking reverence, as Colin 
Burrow notes below (p. 000), the joke ends up being as much on Biron himself as on 
the dullards he berates. The irony, as the King points out shortly afterwards (‘How 
well he’s read to reason against reading’ [1.1.94]), is that Biron’s larger claim that 
spiritual enlightenment comes not from books, but from gazing into a beautiful 
woman’s eyes (1.1.72-93) is itself built upon the very literary method that he 
disavows here. Not only is Biron’s argument a commonplace in the Petrarchan 
tradition, but the speech itself (the last fourteen lines of which constitute a sonnet) is 
made up of commonplace learning and of phrases culled from the authority of others. 
As such, it is a model of the very humanist textual practice it ostensibly rejects. 
Instances in the speech include the world-weary ‘all delights are vain’ (1.1.80), a 
commonplace that repeatedly turns up in early modern literature, including 
Middleton’s The Nice Valour (3.3.36) and Book 2 of The Faerie Queene (II.v.27.2). 
A further notable example from later in the speech is the analogy ‘Study is like the 
heavens’ glorious sun | That will not be deep-searched with saucy looks’ (1.1.84-5), 
an (appropriately transformative) imitation of the proverb ‘He that gazes upon the sun 
shall at last be blind’ (cf. Dent, 1981, S971.1). The joke, then, is partly on Biron and 
partly on humanist methods of reading, but also an implicit recognition that those 
very methods are essential to literary composition. Authorities are what produce 
eloquence – even if they need skillful hands to transform them from slavish mimicry 
to true imitation. 
* 
It is with this literary sense of authority that Shakespeare and Authority begins. The 
next two chapters in this volume revisit the question of Shakespeare’s sources, and 
both suggest that we need a more capacious term to reflect his range of influences and 
his mode of literary composition. In Chapter Two, Colin Burrow proposes that we 
speak not of Shakespeare’s sources, but of his authorities, arguing that Shakespeare’s 
‘narrative’ sources have been explored at the expense of discursive texts. Burrow 
suggests that we should pay attention to a wide range of texts including narrative 
works, rhetorical treatises and works of philosophy, which provide the contentious 
seeds of thought within Shakespearean drama. He discusses examples from 1 Henry 
 
 
IV, which shows how Shakespeare used Cicero’s De Oratore to enhance Prince Hal’s 
political and rhetorical authority, and ends by arguing that in Hamlet and King Lear a 
hybrid mingling of ‘authorities’, ranging from Cicero and Seneca to Melanchthon, 
come to the fore in speeches by characters within the drama who are themselves 
suffering crises of authority. In Chapter Three, Drakakis also suggests that the terms 
of ‘source study’ are unsatisfactory, proposing the term ‘resources’ in response to 
Burrow’s ‘authorities’. Theorised through Roland Barthes, Gérard Genette, and 
Jacques Derrida, and providing a close reading of Hamlet in this context, Drakakis 
presents a radical questioning of the nature of the ‘text’ itself, and offers an account of 
the palimpsestic nature of Shakespeare’s dramatic texts.  
 Chapter Four (re)turns to linguistic authority, comparing Shakespeare and 
Nashe, and considering the idea that Shakespeare’s cultural authority can be indexed 
by the number and placement of Shakespearean citations in the Oxford English 
Dictionary. Giles Goodland suggests that various changes in editorial policy and the 
development of electronic resources in the past three decades have had important 
effects on that authority. This research raises important warnings about Shakespeare’s 
pre-eminent position as an authority for lexicographical and historical linguistic 
research, and highlights the transformative potential of digital resources in re-writing 
narratives of linguistic authority. In Chapter Five, Margaret Tudeau-Clayton 
continues the discussion of Shakespeare’s linguistic authority, exploring the 
relationship between ‘Englishness’ and linguistic authority in The Merry Wives of 
Windsor through a discussion of the phrase ‘the King’s English’ in the Folio version 
of that play. Tudeau-Clayton argues that this phrase is commonly used as a 
rhetorical/ideological tool to produce by exclusion the centre of ownership and 
authority it represents, but is specifically interrogated in the Folio version of Merry 
Wives, which sets against it an inclusionary idea of ‘our English’ as a ‘gallymaufry’ 
without a centre. Eric Heinze also touches on the relationship between national 
identity and Shakespearean authority in Chapter Six. As post-Renaissance Europe 
created modern concepts of statehood and sovereignty, figures like Bodin, Grotius, 
and Hobbes undertook ‘constructive’, system-building theories of sovereign authority.  
Dramatists, in the meantime, de-constructed sovereignty by unsettling the divergent 
bases of authority and legitimacy claimed for it. Concepts like ‘rule of law’, ‘popular 
consent’, or ‘natural law’ often serve to characterise rival legitimacy claims, but such 
 
 
concepts’ scope and interrelationships can be vague. Through a reading of 
Shakespeare’s historical tetralogies, Heinze’s essay proposes a vocabulary and 
topology of legal and political authority within early modern drama.   
 
 Part Two of the volume contains five chapters that directly focus on 
Shakespeare’s own representations of authority within the plays. In Chapter Seven, 
Angus Vine considers 1 and 2 Henry IV as plays that are all about the construction, 
questioning, and acceptance of authority – paternal authority, monarchical authority, 
divine authority. This chapter argues that central to their engagement with the idea of 
authority is a persistent rhetoric of financial reckoning and fiscal responsibility, a 
language of debit and credit. He connects this language with a broader discourse of 
reckoning, financial, but also metaphorical, that was emerging in early modern 
England. The chapter demonstrates that in 1 and 2 Henry IV – and elsewhere, as 
Eleanor Lowe also shows in her analysis of Twelfth Night in Chapter Ten – 
Shakespeare invokes an emerging discourse of accountability, which is both spiritual 
and financial, metaphorical and actual, first to examine notions of personal and public 
responsibility, and then to explore what those notions mean for the constitution of 
political, and more particularly, monarchical authority. Joseph Sterrett’s essay 
examines the material and social effects of an exchange of trust between a king, 
Henry VIII, and his counsellor, Thomas Cranmer in Shakespeare and Fletcher’s All is 
True. The ring that the King gives Cranmer is both nothing and everything: nothing in 
that it could be anything, any ring, and everything because it is the King’s and is 
declared to be so. Such a performance of trust not only protects the King’s favoured 
minister, it dares and threatens Cranmer’s enemies to do or say something that would 
jeopardise the King’s trust in them. It is thus a uniquely assertive form of trust, a site 
where material, political, and social values meet. Daniel Cadman returns to the notion 
of Shakespeare’s authorities (in Burrow’s sense), considering Measure for Measure as 
a response to De Constantia and Politica, the two major works of the Flemish neo-
stoic philosopher and political theorist, Justus Lipsius. Cadman highlights that Duke 
Vincentio’s methods of exercising his authority are two-fold: the Duke commends 
and seeks to inspire the virtue of constancy in his subjects (as recommended in De 
Constantia), whilst, at the same time, using questionable methods to strengthen his 
own political power (similar to the often underhand political pragmatism advocated in 
the Politica). The representation of such strategies is part of the play’s sustained 
 
 
interrogation of Lipsian statecraft and the effects of the tensions generated through the 
co-existence of the two principal tenets of constancy and governmental prudence. 
 
 Like Joseph Sterrett’s, Eleanor Lowe’s chapter focuses on the materiality of 
authority. Her analysis of Malvolio’s authority as steward in Chapter Ten is viewed 
through the prism of Viscount Montague’s Household Book of 1595. Montague lists 
his servants, their duties and his rules for the management of them and the household. 
It provides a detailed description of the activities and responsibilities of his servants, 
particular to their specific role, and prioritises the steward as most important in the 
household. Lowe examines Malvolio’s interactions and conduct in Twelfth Night in 
the light of the steward’s ambiguous position between responsibility and authority, 
concentrating on the performance of domestic authority on the early modern stage. In 
Chapter Eleven, Laetitia Sansonetti considers the authority of the poet-playwright-
actor, a theme that is also explored by James Harriman-Smith in Chapter Twelve. 
Sansonetti analyses Julius Caesar. In that play, the character of Cinna-the-poet in 
Julius Caesar is often considered to represent a form of poetic counter-authority. Far 
from taking the murdered poet as a figure of self-identification for Shakespeare, this 
chapter argues that Cinna deserves to die. The two poets in Julius Caesar fare so ill 
when it comes to convincing others (the plebeians not to kill him for Cinna in Act 3, 
Brutus and Octavius to patch up their quarrel for the anonymous camp poet in Act 4) 
because they fail at composing and delivering effective rhetorical speeches. By 
showing the failures of uninventive poets on stage, Shakespeare is actually staging the 
triumph of a more rounded figure of authority, that of the poet-playwright-actor. 
 
 In Chapter Twelve – the first of Part Three of the volume, which considers 
Shakespeare as authority – James Harriman Smith distinguishes two ways in which the 
authority of actors with regard to Shakespeare was articulated during the playwright’s 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rise to the status of a national poet. From the 
reopening of the theatres to the early 1700s, actors appeared as apostles, handing down 
Shakespeare’s intentions from generation to generation as part of an independent 
performance tradition. The career of David Garrick, from 1741 to 1776 was marked, 
however, with the claim that, rather than inheriting a connection to Shakespeare, this 
new star was Shakespeare reborn. Resurrection had replaced succession as a mode for 
articulating the actor’s authority. Harriman-Smith explains this paradigm shift with an 
 
 
analysis of the rise of textual editing between the death of Betterton and the debut of 
Garrick, showing how it destabilised the transmission of theatrical practice while also 
justifying Garrick’s claim to bring Shakespeare to life through a close study of his 
writing. The chapter then concludes with a brief study of theatrical authority beyond 
Garrick, focusing on the critical writing of John Philip Kemble. Andrew Rudd considers 
Shakespeare’s authority in the field of architecture, examining the authority 
Shakespeare provided in the eighteenth century and Romantic period as a rule-breaker 
whose genius transcended both Classicism and the Gothic. Specifically, it considers his 
appeal to the architect John Soane, who referred to Shakespeare’s plays (not always 
accurately) in his lectures to the Royal Academy and whose house in Lincoln’s Inn 
Fields exemplified the eclecticism Shakespeare’s ‘infinite variety’ (Antony and 
Cleopatra, 2.2.248). supposedly mandated. It discusses Shakespeare criticism by 
Alexander Pope, Elizabeth Montagu and Samuel Johnson, as well as the ideas of 
Soane’s associates John Britton, Joseph Gandy and Barbara Hofland. Rudd argues that 
Shakespeare acted as an authority for Soane to reconcile both personal crises and 
stylistic divisions between Neo-Classicism and Romanticism. Benedicte Seynhaeve 
and Raphaël Ingelbien revisit the question of Shakespeare and national identity, 
discussing Shakespeare’s identity as the national ‘Gothic Bard’ in the context of Irish 
appeals to his authority in the Romantic period. Invocations of Shakespeare in English 
Gothic helped situate the genre in a native tradition. However, Shakespeare’s status as 
a national ‘Gothic Bard’ was complicated in the Irish context. Chapter Fourteen shows 
how Charles Robert Maturin (1780-1824) used Shakespeare to justify a distinctly Irish 
aesthetics of Gothic excess. His deployment of Shakespearean horror and hyperbolic 
emotion is contrasted with Ann Radcliffe’s Shakespearean blend of terror and 
melancholy, simultaneously revealing very different interpretations of Burkean 
aesthetics. Like the Shakespearean work of the Irish painter James Barry, Maturin’s 
Gothic writings were condemned by British commentators, whose sense of a Gothic 
Shakespeare was incompatible with the Irishmen’s perceived extravagance. The 
debates surrounding their works show that Shakespeare was a contested national icon 
within British Romantic culture.   
  
 The volume concludes with two essays that consider Shakespeare in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In Chapter Fifteen, Paul Tyndall and Fred 
Ribkoff discuss Peter Brook’s film version of King Lear. Brook’s film dramatizes a 
 
 
paradigm shift from the discretionary authority and divine right of Kings to a 
recognizably modern rule of law governed by instrumental rationality. When Lear 
begs his daughter to ‘reason not the need’ (2.2.445), he is unknowingly asking her to 
act counter to brutally rational divisive forces he himself has set in motion. The 
rupture of bonds between power and authority, and between family members, is a 
result of the emergence of a modern sensibility. In Brook’s hands, the Lear story 
becomes a malleable myth chronicling the transition from a primitive, patriarchal 
culture into a culture reflective of Brook’s own post-war, existential sensibility. 
Brook’s Lear evokes the primitive world of Shakespeare’s King Lear as well as the 
inevitable collapse of civilization characteristic of ancient Greek tragedy, while at the 
same time embodying the apocalyptic vision of post-war avant-garde theatre and film. 
Thus Shakespeare’s Lear, although clearly the source for Brook’s film, is one of 
many ‘authorities’ operating as an intertext. Brook forwards the tragic consequences 
of the modern act of giving up personal freedom and power – thus authority – to the 
state for the sake of security and social order, an act culminating in the erasure of all 
signs of civilization. In the final chapter of this volume, Jane Partner examines the 
ways in which Shakespeare's authority is constructed and represented in 
contemporary visual culture, and places a diverse selection of contemporary artworks 
in the longer history of the interpretation of Shakespeare in painting, sculpture and 
printed media. The first section examines the presentation of Shakespeare himself, 
examining modern portraits and memorabilia in the context of earlier visual 
constructions of Shakespeare’s ‘genius’. The second section considers contemporary 
paintings and video art that take on Shakespearean subjects, interpreting them as 
responses to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century usages of these same subjects in the 
genre of ‘history’ painting. The final section examines artists who use Shakespeare’s 
text itself as their material, either in graphic projects or in the form of digital 
sculpture. 
 
  If one of the purposes of this book is to examine how Shakespeare became the 
archetypal figure of English cultural authority, another is to illuminate why – a 
question that, as David Hopkins has observed, has received rather less attention 
(Hopkins, 2004, p. 263). Two different answers to that question, and two different 
strands, emerge from the essays here: first of all, the way in which Shakespeare freely 
adopts, adapts, translates, and transforms his own sources and authorities; and second, 
 
 
the extent to which his plays forensically examine the nature of authority itself. But to 
worry at authority (political, historical, or literary) is not the same thing as to reject it 
outright, and in Shakespearean drama, as Stephen Greenblatt has recently noted 
(Greenblatt, 2010, p. 17), the exercise of authority is not something easily evaded or 
laid aside lightly. Instead, Shakespeare’s plays insistently emphasize the notion of 
authority, only to destabilize straightforward understandings of it. Such complexity 
inevitably colours the ways in which actors, readers, and audiences respond to 
Shakespearean authority, as well as the ways in which the author’s reputation is 
forged in the following ages. Shakespeare and Authority therefore enables a new 
understanding of Shakespearean authority by foregrounding both its historical 











1 For images of Jonson (including his own statue in Westminster Abbey), see Hearn, 
2014. 
2 While this is partly explained by neoclassical dogma and the growing influence of 
French critics, Rymer himself, as Fred Parker has emphasized, ‘grounds his criticism 
in an appeal to the common sense of the reader’; see Parker, 1988, p. 18. 
3 In the same place, his essay ‘Four Elizabethan Dramatists’, Eliot also observed 
(surely with his tongue in his cheek) that Rymer still ‘makes out a very good case’ 
(Eliot, 1932, p. 97, n. 3). 
4 For the connection between Shakespeare’s education and his classical learning, the 
most thorough account remains Baldwin, 1944. 
5 For eighteenth-century editing of Shakespeare, see Parker, 1989; Seary, 1990; and 
Jarvis, 1995; for the Stratford Jubilee, see Rumbold, 2012; and for Malone and the 
emergence of notions of textual and critical authenticity, see De Grazia, 1991. 
6 Although this is not the place for a rehearsal of the Shakespearean authorship 
controversy, it is worth noting that the refusal to believe that a Stratford grammar boy 
could have written the plays of Shakespeare, and subsequent attributions to Bacon, 
the Earl of Oxford et al is directly related to these contested notions of Shakespearean 
authority. 
                                                     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 In our range and scope, we, of course, follow Taylor, 1989, the exemplary 
multitudinous account of Shakespeare’s afterlife. 
